Making War and Building Peace: 
The United Nations since the 1990’s

Michael W. Doyle
Harold Brown Professor of Law and International Affairs
Columbia University
md2221@columbia.edu

and

Nicholas Sambanis
Associate Professor of Political Science
Yale University
Nicholas.Sambanis@yale.edu
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Acknowledgments

This book addresses three audiences: policy-makers/debaters, students and political scientists. We have learned from each of them as well.

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Nicholas Sambanis      Michael Doyle
New Haven, Connecticut  New York, New York

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The collapse of state institutions in Somalia, a coup in Haiti, and civil wars in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and other countries have marked the distinctive contours of civil strife in the past twenty years. The international community’s responses to these emergencies have been, despite sometimes major efforts, mixed at best: occasional successes in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so.

At the end of the Cold War, the member states of the United Nations (UN) expanded its agenda, defining a near-revolution in the relation between what is in the legitimate realm of state sovereignty and what is subject to legitimate international intervention. From 1990 through 1993, the UN Security Council adopted a strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII, the enforcement provisions concerning international peace and security. Member states thus endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention just as a series of ethnic and civil wars erupted across the globe. Unfulfilled commitments, on the one hand, and escalating use of force, on the other, soon provoked a severe crisis in “peace enforcement.” In Bosnia and Somalia “peace enforcement” amounted to “war-making” as the United Nations threatened to impose by force outcomes – ranging from disarmament, to safe havens, “no fly zones” and new state borders – on armed factions that recognized no political authority superior to their own. Elsewhere, as in Rwanda, the UN record was a failure even to attempt to exercise enforcement as peace agreements fell apart. As a consequence, more than 700,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus fell at the hands of genocidal extremists that had seized the government. The current balance sheet on UN “war-making” thus suggests that while the UN has served an effective role in legitimizing enforcement coalitions for inter-state, armed collective security (as in Korea and against Iraq in Gulf War I), the United Nations has proven to be a very ineffective peace enforcer, or war-maker, in the many intra-state, civil conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War world.

2 We realize that, and will explain below how, the UN regarded these activities as “peacekeeping” or “peace enforcement,” not war-making. The parties, however, can have reason to see them differently. Imagine, for example, how the U.S. Federal government would have viewed a decision of the European Concert in 1864 to establish Washington, Baltimore, Atlanta, Mobile and New Orleans as “safe havens” and to ban all interference with American commerce in American territorial waters – a “no sail zone” – by either the Federal Government or the Confederacy. None of this questions whether the UNPROFOR measures were justified.
But that is only half the story. At the same time, evidence from the peace operations in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), and East Timor suggests a seemingly contradictory (but actually complementary) conclusion. Here the UN succeeded in fostering peace through consent, building on an enhancement of Chapter VI-based peace-making negotiations and a creative, multidimensional implementation of the transitional authority that the peace agreements provided.

Clearly, consent does not guarantee success. The wars in Angola refuted each of the many agreements that supposedly settled them and the Rwanda genocide followed on the peace agreement signed at Arusha. Weak implementation undermines even the best of agreements. None, moreover, of the successfully implemented operations lacked challenges. In Cambodia the United Nations undertook a multidimensional peace operation – the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – but the peace it left behind in 1993 was partial as the Khmer Rouge resumed sporadic armed resistance. Cambodia also suffered a coup in 1997 and then struggled ahead with an elected government that has been accused of numerous election irregularities. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) and Mozambique peace is firmer. But even there the long run prospects of social integration remain problematic. In Bosnia, the international community struggles to unite what emerged from the Dayton Peace process as a *de facto* partition. Current stability is a direct function of the coercive glue of NATO (SFOR) peacekeeping. The international community intervened and assumed temporary sovereignty in Kosovo and East Timor. East Timor is now an independent state; the task of assisting the development of a viable polity in Kosovo has barely begun.

Despite overcoming many challenges and achieving many successes, the UN’s future as peace-maker has been under challenge in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere from those who fail to understand how successful the UN has been and can continue to be in a “peace-building” role.\(^3\) Obviously, multilateral peacebuilding cannot replace national foreign policy, even in policies directed toward states in crisis. Not only does multilateral peace enforcement regularly fail, but multilateral peacebuilding because of its impartial character will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will choose. It is not the favored means to impose neo-imperial clients, acquire military bases or garner economic concessions. Successful multilateral peacebuilding builds functioning states that can defend their own interests. But where states seek a sustainable peace to end a festering civil war, multilateral peacebuilding, when well-designed and well-managed, can produce that peace from which neighbors and the wider international community will

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\(^3\) The U.S. Congress, *National Security Revitalization Act* (H.R. 7) included provisions for charging the UN for a wide range of indirect as well as direct costs of US participation in peacekeeping. If it had been adopted in this form, the legislation (in the eyes of many expert witnesses) would have bankrupted UN peacekeeping as the US and other states proceeded to charge the UN for what have been extensive voluntary commitments in support of UN peacekeeping efforts. See the testimony of Secretary of State Christopher (Thursday January 26, 1995) and C. William Maynes (January 19, 1995) before the House International Relations Committee.
benefit, and do so while sharing costs on a fair basis. Clearly, we should avoid “throwing the baby out with the bath water.”

Stopping civil wars has never been more important. Since the end of the Cold War period, almost all new armed conflicts have occurred within the territories of sovereign states. Repeat civil wars in Rwanda and Angola, products of failed peace agreements, alone resulted in several million casualties in the 1990s. Internal (civil or intra-state) war has replaced inter-state war as the paramount concern of organizations charged with maintaining international peace and security. Civil wars have negative security and economic externalities and can destabilize entire regions. Beyond the deaths and displacements that are caused directly by the war, civil wars also cause a deterioration of health levels for the entire region long after the fighting ends. Civil wars have regional contagion or diffusion effects and they reduce rates of economic growth both in the directly affected countries and their neighbors. Civil wars typically do not occur between standing armies, but rather between a government army, or militia, and one or more rebel organizations. Violence is usually targeted at civilians and the objectives of civil wars range from secession to control of the state or resource predation. Civilian deaths as a percentage of all war-related deaths increased to 90% in 1990 from approximately 50% in the 18th century. Internal wars have created approximately 13 million refugees and 38 million internally displaced persons.

This book will discuss theories of the origins of and solutions to civil wars, the principles behind and the practices of the United Nations as an institution and the debate over doctrines and strategies of intervention. But its key purpose is to explain how the international community, and the UN in particular, can assist the reconstruction of peace in civil war-torn lands. We address the policy problem, but we assess it in ways that draw on and apply relevant theories and methods in political science.

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4 There have been few inter-state wars, including the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea—which is itself the continuation of an earlier internal war—the Gulf War in 1991, the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2004, respectively, and the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved many neighboring states and had a large civil war component.


7 James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, “Economic growth, civil wars, and spatial spillovers,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (February 2002), 91-110.

We focus on the international role in peacebuilding, even though it is only part of what makes for success or failure. We will argue that “sustainable peace” is the measure of successful peacebuilding. Our central claim is that successful and unsuccessful efforts to resolve civil wars are influenced by three key factors that characterize the environment of the postwar civil peace:

1. the degree of hostility of the factions (measured in terms of human cost – deaths and displacements-- the type of war, and the number of factions),
2. the extent of local capacities remaining after the war (measured, for example, in per capita GDP or energy consumption), and
3. the amount of international assistance (measured in terms of economic assistance or the type of mandate given to and the number of troops committed to the peace effort).

Together, these three constitute the interdependent logic of a “peacebuilding triangle”: the deeper the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.\(^9\) We find support for this hypothesis both in our case studies and in our statistical analysis of all civil wars since 1945. Controlling for levels of hostility and local capacities, we find that the international capacities – UN missions with a mandate and resources to build peace—work in increasing the chance for peace after civil war.

We find that peace operations must be designed to fit the case, with the kind and degree of international authority to shape the transition from war to peace. The valuable monitoring that can be sufficient to reinforce trust and serve as a midwife to peace in one case is the idle observer that merely witnesses the collapse of a peace among hostile factions in a second case that would have required robust transitional executive authority for success.

We further find that peace operations supplemented by extensive programs to rebuild economies have a particularly prominent role in promoting long-run peace. Peacebuilding requires the provision of temporary security, the building of new institutions capable of resolving future conflicts peaceably and an economy capable of offering civilian employment to former soldiers and material progress to future citizens.

Peacebuilding, however, does not require that the US, or another great power, take the lead. When residual violence is plentiful, such leadership may be necessary. In less violent circumstances, however, multilateralism works well, delivering the legitimacy, staying power, experienced UN peacekeepers and multiple sources of modest national commitment that it promises.

Lastly, controversially, we find that peacebuilding trumps military victories. Most civil wars since World War Two have been settled by military victory and these

victories can deliver a stable peace by eliminating the organized military opposition that truces leave in place to stir up future trouble. But a comprehensive peace agreement implemented through a peace operation has an even better success rate.

Our policy message is simple: while the UN is very poor at “war” – imposing a settlement by force – it can be very good at “peace” – mediating and implementing a comprehensively negotiated peace. This will not shock the insiders. What is new in this book is demonstrating this assertion carefully and explaining why and how this is the case. In exploring “why” we argue that the UN, as a multilateral organization, cannot manage force as rationally as is necessary but it is well-suited to mediate, mobilize and manage legitimate international assistance. These institutional capacities reflect wider views on the illegitimacy of colonialism and the growing acceptability of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.10

In explaining “how” we identify the sources of failures in UN war-making and explore the four innovations (enhanced forms of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and “discrete enforcement”) that led to success. And we describe how the authority embedded in peacebuilding operations must be tailored to the circumstances they face.

These conclusions are important, partly because the use of UN authorized peace operations greatly increased in the 1990’s, reflecting a new wave of interventionism and redefining a new generation of strategies in peacekeeping designed to fulfill the ambitious expectations unleashed by the new willingness to intervene. The connections between interventionism, new strategies and successful peacebuilding were intimate and serious: no matter how well-intentioned an intervention is, unless the intervenor can also claim that the intervention is likely to produce a sustainable improvement -- both peace and human rights – the intervention is unlikely to be either ethically justifiable or politically viable.

**The New Interventionism**

As Secretary-General Kofi Annan memorably described the new UN role in 1998: “Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading.”11 He was reflecting the activism of the Security Council,

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10 In 2003-04, the importance attached by the United States and its coalition of allies in Iraq in both securing international legitimacy and mobilizing international assistance in peacebuilding there are one measure of this. One frequent critic of the UN, William Safire, even went so far as to acknowledge that the contrast between the successful elections in Afghanistan in October 2004 and the escalating crisis in Iraq could partly be attributed to the multilateral legitimacy the former enjoyed, in William Safire “The Best Political News of 2004,” October 26, 2004.

which between 1987 and 1994 had quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The annual peacekeeping budget skyrocketed correspondingly from $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period, thus reaching to about three times the UN’s regular operating budget of $1.2 billion.\footnote{Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60; S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, p.4.}

The activities of the Security Council in preventive diplomacy and sanctions, the Secretariat’s role in election monitoring, and above all, the massive growth in peacekeeping and peace enforcement all testified to the newly appreciated role the international community wanted the UN – or some body – to play.

The international legal prohibitions against intervention were more relevant than ever given the demands for national dignity made by the newly independent states of both the Third World and the former Second World. But the rules as to what constitutes intervention and what constitutes international protection of basic human rights shifted as well. Sovereignty was redefined to incorporate a global interest in human rights protection. The traditional borders between sovereign consent and intervention were blurred. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement almost merged into “robust peacekeeping” which signaled a willingness to use force if needed whether in consent-based peacekeeping or imposed peace enforcement. A newly functioning United Nations, moreover, was seen to be a legitimate agent to decide when sovereignty was and was not violated.

The revival of the UN Security Council led to a reaffirmation after years of Cold War neglect of the UN Charter’s Article 2, clause 7 affirming nonintervention, except as mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII. The UN then claimed a “cleaner hands” monopoly on legitimate intervention. Although the letter of the Charter prohibited UN authorizations of force other than as a response to threats or breaches of "international" peace, the Genocide Convention and the record of condemnation of colonialism and apartheid opened an informally legitimate basis for involvement in domestic conflict. The Security Council’s practice thus broadened the traditional reasons for intervention, including aspects of domestic political oppression short of massacre and human suffering associated with economic misfeasance – the so-called “failed states” and the droit d’ingerence.\footnote{See Lori F. Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), G. Helman and S. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” \textit{Foreign Policy} 89 (Winter 1992/93): 3-20, but for a more skeptical reading Edward Mortimer, “Under What Circumstances Should the UN Intervene Militarily in a ‘Domestic’ Crisis?”, in Olara Otunnu and Michael Doyle, eds., \textit{Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century} (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998): pp. 111-144.} Building on new interpretations advanced during the Cold War that made, for example, apartheid a matter for international sanction, the United Nations addressed the starvation of the Somali people when it became clear that its government...
was incapable of doing so. (In this case, however, the traditional criteria of “international” threats were also invoked – including Somali refugees spreading across international borders – in order to justify forcible intervention under Chapter VII.) The Security Council also demanded international humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, insisting for example that humanitarian assistance be allowed to reach the people affected in Yugoslavia and in Iraq. 14

Regions differed on the meaning of operational sovereignty. The Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) remained a bastion of strict sovereignty and nonintervention is the norm. Although Cambodia and Burma's acceptance into ASEAN were delayed by their human rights record and instability, they were both eventually accepted. The Organization for African Unity (OAU), on the other hand has defined standards of (1990) “Good Governance” that included democracy and declared (3 July 1993) that internal disputes are matters of regional concern. And, more strikingly, the OAS (in Res. 1080 and in the “Santiago Commitment of 1991”) has declared coups against democracy illegitimate and has adopted economic sanctions against coups in Haiti and Peru. The European Union makes democracy an element in the criteria it demands for consideration in membership.

It was also important that the “international community” had a newly legitimate means of expressing its collective will on an internationally impartial basis. The Security Council (SC) lays claim to being the equivalent of a “global parliament” or “global jury” representing not merely the individual states of which it is composed but also a collective will and voice of the “international community.” The SC includes five permanent members (US, Russia, France, UK, and China) and ten nonpermanent, elected members, always including members from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its authorization for an intervention requires the affirmative vote of 9 states, including no

14 In an important recent report, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has reaffirmed the called upon the Security Council to recognize “a responsibility to protect.” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). States of course have the first responsibility to protect the basic rights and welfare of their citizens, but if they should fail to do so through lack of will or capacity, the responsibility should devolve, the Commission argues, onto the international community, with the Security Council as its agent. Widely discussed, though not formally endorsed at the United Nations in 2002, the Report sets a new benchmark against which future interventions and noninterventions will be judged. The Report, however, deals less well with a separate problem: What should happen when the Security Council is deadlocked? Michael Walzer, in “The Politics of Rescue” (Dissent, Winter 1995), has persuasively argued that the Security Council should not have the last word, when it comes up with the wrong answer. Tom Farer has explored the circumstances under which the responsibility to intervene devolves from a deadlocked Council to regional organizations and national governments. See Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: legality and legitimacy,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and, Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

negative votes from the five permanent members (the P5) and four positive votes from the smaller countries. Such a vote would usually have to incorporate representatives of a majority of major races and religions. It would always include representatives of large and small countries, capitalist and socialist economies and democratic and non-democratic polities. If the mandated operation is UN directed and if troops and funding are required, many other troop contributing states will be needed and they can say, “No,” in practice. The combination makes for a genuinely international impartial intervention, and hence “cleaner hands.”

Those developments coincided with a temporary conjunction of power and will. Following the collapse of the USSR, the US experienced a “unipolar moment” when its power eclipsed that of all other states. At the same time the international community, including the US, adopted a strategy of “assertive multilateralism,” which lasted from the Gulf War in January 1991 until the October 3, 1993 disaster in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council, led by the United States, provided a degree of commitment and resourceful leadership that the UN had rarely seen before. Eschewing the national role of “Globocop” in order to address a pressing domestic agenda, the Clinton Administration encouraged then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to take an ever more assertive role in international crises. The small dissenting minority in the Security Council—which included China on some occasions and Russia on others—was not prepared to resist the US on issues that did not affect their paramount national interests. The successful reversal of Saddam Hussein’s aggression in the Gulf and the December 1992 US-led rescue of segments of the Somali population from starvation heralded what appeared to be a remarkable partnership. The Security Council decreed, the United States led, and – conveniently, for the while – many other states paid and supported.

But cleaner hands need not mean better hands. The international community still needed to find a way to promote sustainable peace, one that enlisted the support of a substantial majority of the local population and embodied basic principles of human rights. This proved to be a challenge in the 1990’s as massive UN interventions, war-like enforcement operations, provoked some of the same sorts of resistance as did colonial interventions in places such as Somalia and Bosnia. But in other cases the UN found a way to cultivate consent and then build a peace with genuine indigenous roots. These peacebuilding operations rested on important innovations in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and institutional reconstruction, as well as discrete residual enforcement, all of which evolved to address particular aspects of these challenges.

**Generations of UN Peace Operations**

In the early 1990’s, with the end of the Cold War, the UN’s agenda for peace and security thus rapidly expanded. At the request of the UN Security Council Summit of
January 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). In addition to preventive diplomacy designed to head off conflicts before they became violent, the Secretary General outlined the four interconnected roles that he hoped the UN would play in the fast changing context of post-Cold War international politics.

- **preventive diplomacy** undertaken in order “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” Involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning and possibly “preventive deployment” of UN authorized forces, preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects of peaceful settlement.

- **peace-enforcement**, authorized to act with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these military forces are composed of heavily armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary-General.

- **peace-making**, designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation and other forms of negotiation, UN peace-making initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences.

- **peace-keeping**, established to deploy a “United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,” as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials to implement an agreed peace.

- **post-conflict reconstruction** organized to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace.

The Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace is the culmination of an evolution of UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945. It combines in a radical way instruments of war-like

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17 The Secretary-General and the UN often refers to this as “post-conflict peacebuilding.” To avoid confusion with the wider meaning of peacebuilding we employ, we will call it post-conflict reconstruction.
enforcement and peace-like negotiation that were once kept separate and that evolved separately. A unique vocabulary separates distinct strategies that fit within the generic UN doctrine of building peace. These strategies, evolving over time, have encompassed three generational paradigms of peacebuilding. They include not only the early activities identified in UN Charter Chapter VI (or so-called “6 and 1/2”\textsuperscript{19}) \textit{first generation} peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of \textit{second generation} operations that rely on the consent of parties and an even more ambitious group of \textit{third generation} operations that operate with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties’ acquiescence. In today’s circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more factions in domestic civil wars, not all of whom are clearly identifiable – and few of whom are stable negotiating parties. Current peace operations thus intrude into aspects of domestic sovereignty once thought to be beyond the purview of UN activity.

Indeed, the post World War II UN Charter can be seen as having been designed for interstate wars (e.g. Article 39’s threats to “international” peace); appropriately so since from 1900 to 1941, 80\% of all wars were interstate among state armies. But from 1945 to 1976, 85\% of all wars were on the territory of one state and internally oriented – of course with proxies.\textsuperscript{20} Traditional peace operations, or \textit{first generation peacekeeping}, were designed to respond to inter-state crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward. As F.T. Liu, an eminent peacekeeping official of the UN has noted: monitoring, consent, neutrality, non-use of force, and unarmed peacekeeping – the principles and practices of first generation peacekeeping – constituted a stable and interdependent combination. These key principles were articulated by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in conjunction

\textsuperscript{18} It is worth recalling that the time-line of evolution has by no means been chronologically straightforward. One of the most extensive “third generation” operations undertaken by the UN was ONUC in the then-Congo, from 1960-64, which preceded the spate of “second generation” operations that began with UNTAG in Namibia in 1989.

\textsuperscript{19} The “6 and 1/2” refers to the fact that peacekeeping per se is nowhere described in the Charter and thus falls between Chapter VI peacemaking (good offices, etc.) and Chapter VII peace enforcement.


\textsuperscript{21} The first peacekeeping operation was the United Nations’ Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt, deployed in October 1956 to maintain a truce between the Egyptian army and Israel, England, and France during the Suez crisis. UNEF’s experience helped define the four principles of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, neutrality, and use of force only in self-defense. The UN Treaty Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was deployed in 1948 in Palestine, but it was a limited observer mission.
with the creation of the first peacekeeping operation (PKO), the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai, which was sent to separate Israel and Egypt following the Franco-British-Israeli intervention in Suez in 1956.\textsuperscript{22} The principle of neutrality referred to the national origin of UN troops and precluded the use of troops from the permanent five members of the Council in order to quiet fears of superpower intervention. Impartiality implied that the UN would not take sides in the dispute and was a precondition for the achievement of the consent of all the parties. Enjoying the consent of all factions, in turn made it easier for monitors of peacekeepers not to have to use force except in self-defense.\textsuperscript{23} Lastly, the Secretary General exercised control of the force and the Security Council authorized it (or rarely, the General Assembly under the auspices of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”).\textsuperscript{24}

Impartiality and neutrality are frequently used interchangeably. Scholars and practitioners often speak of peacekeepers as “neutral,” “disinterested,” “impartial,” or “unbiased” and they tend to mistake the need for impartiality with a policy of “strict neutrality” and a disposition of passivity. In this book, we define neutrality as a synonym for noninterference with respect to peacekeeping outcomes and impartiality as equal enforcement of unbiased rules. Good cops act impartially but not neutrally when they stop one individual from victimizing another. We argue that it is as important for peacekeepers to be impartial concerning, for example, which party in a freely conducted democratic election wins the election as it is for them to be non-neutral (i.e. not passive) with respect to violations of the peace and obstructions to their ability to implement their mandate. This is closely related to the interpretation of the fourth principle of peacekeeping – the non-use of force. Peacekeeping uses soldiers not to win wars, but rather to preserve the peace. But peacekeepers must also protect their right to discharge their functions, in accordance with the spirit of the parties’ consent as extended at the outset of the operation. Raising the costs of non-cooperation for the parties must, on occasion, allow the use of force in defense of the mandate. The limited use of force to protect a mandate authorized by a peace treaty or to enforce an agreed upon ceasefire (as happened in Cyprus in 1974, or Namibia in 1989), does not equate peacekeeping with


\textsuperscript{23} Traditional peacekeeping is a shorthand term that describes many but by no means all Cold War peacekeeping missions (the most notable exception being the Congo operation and possibly also the Cyprus operation, as we discuss later in the book). For cogent analyses of different types of peacekeeping, see Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” \textit{International Affairs} 69, no. 3 (1993), 451-464; F. T. Liu, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping and the Nonuse of Force}, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Weiss, Thomas G., ed., \textit{Collective Security in a Changing World} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

\textsuperscript{24} A controversial resolution introduced in the context of the Korean War designed to circumvent the deadlock in the Security Council that resulted from the return of the USSR to the Council, following the boycott that allowed the Council in the USSR’s absence to authorize the US led force in Korea in June 1950. It was applied to authorize the Sinai peace force in 1956.
peace enforcement (that attempts to impose an overall settlement), but it does generate concerns with mission creep if the need to use force is extensive.

During the Cold War, the UN record indicated much success in interstate conflicts (little in intra-state), much in material and territorial settlement (little in value or identity conflicts).25 The success of traditional peacekeeping was also dependent on successful peacemaking: a strategy designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. Traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) referred to the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and was frequently to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace. Monitoring or observer missions had several of the same objectives as traditional PKOs, though they were typically less well-armed (or unarmed) and focused on monitoring and reporting to the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

Both monitoring operations and traditional peacekeeping provided transparency – an impartial assurance that the other party was not violating the truce – and were supposed to raise the costs of defecting from an agreement by the threat of exposure and the potential (albeit unlikely) resistance of the peacekeeping force. The international legitimacy of UN mandates increased the parties’ benefits of cooperation with the peacekeepers. The price of first generation peacekeeping, as in the long Cyprus operation, was sometimes paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved. Today these monitoring activities continue to play an important role on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria and, until recently, on the border between Kuwait and Iraq.

Monitoring and traditional PKOs were strictly bound by the principle of consent. Consent derives from the parties’ “perceptions of the peacekeepers’ impartiality and moral authority.”26 It reduces the risk to the peacekeepers and preserves the sovereignty of the host state. Eroding consent can significantly diminish the peacekeepers’ ability to discharge their mandate, so the peacekeepers have an incentive to enhance the parties’ consent. Since eroding consent could turn PKOs into multi-billion dollar “obsolescing investments” that are easy hostages to insincere parties, it follows that the UN should

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develop strategies to enhance consent. This flexibility is more easily provided in second generation, multidimensional operations which involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements designed to build the foundations of a self-sustaining peace and have been utilized primarily in post-civil war situations. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. These operations are based on consent of the parties, but the nature of and purposes for which consent is granted are qualitatively different from traditional peacekeeping.

In addition to monitoring and traditional peacekeeping, the key strategy was to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence and laying the foundations for a durable peace. Multidimensional peacekeeping is aimed at capacities-expansion (e.g. economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g. reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society re-building). In these operations, the UN is typically involved in implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali observed in An Agenda for Peace, “peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace...[T]hese may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”

The UN has a commendable record of success, ranging from mixed to transformative, in “second generation,” multidimensional peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). The UN’s role in helping settle those conflicts has been fourfold. It served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces, resettling refugees and supervising transitional civilian authorities; as a peacebuilder monitoring and in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections and economic


28 Agenda for Peace, paragraph 21.

29 Success is of course an ambiguous and contested term. We explain later how we define and measure it in our statistical analysis and case studies.
rehabilitation; and in a very limited way as peace enforcer when the agreements came unstuck.

In Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s lexicon, “peace-enforcing” – effectively war-making – missions are third generation operations, which extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires and, when necessary, authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called “failed states.” Like Chapter VII UN enforcement action to roll back aggression, as in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, the defining characteristic of “third generation” operations is the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate.30 These operations have been of three types. In the first, international forces attempt to impose order without significant local consent, in the absence of comprehensive peace agreement, and must in effect conquer the factions (as was attempted in Somalia). In the second, international forces did not have unanimous consent and have chosen to impose distinct arrangements on parties in the midst of an ongoing war (e.g., no-fly zones, or humanitarian corridors of relief). In the third, international forces exercise force to implement the terms of comprehensive peace from which one or more of the parties has chosen to defect.

Enforcement operations draw upon the authority of UN Charter Article 42, which permits the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security;” Article 25 under which member states “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council;” and Article 43 in which they agree to “make available to the Security Council, on its call, ...armed forces, assistance and facilities…”

Insightful doctrine for these peace-enforcing operations appeared just as Somalia and Bosnia exposed their practical limitations. Recent studies have thoughtfully mapped out the logic of the strategic terrain between traditional UN peacemaking and traditional UN enforcement action. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade and deny.31 By precluding an outcome based on the use of force by the parties, the UN instead uses collective force (if necessary) to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, the UN following this strategy could have established strong points to deter attacks on key humanitarian corridors. (It actually did,

30 Other recent categories include “preventive deployments” deployed with the intention of deterring a possible attack, as in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There the credibility of the deterring force must ensure that the potential aggressor knows that there will be no easy victory. In the event of an armed challenge, the result will be an international war that involves costs so grave as to outweigh the temptations of conquest. Enforcement action against aggression (Korea or the Gulf), conversely, is a matter of achieving victory – “the decisive, comprehensive and synchronized application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize and defeat opponents” – the traditional zero sum terrain of military strategy. See John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, “Second-Generation Multinational Operations,” Washington Quarterly 15 (Summer 1992), pp. 113-131.

but the Serbs bypassed them.) Or it could threaten air strikes, as was done successfully around Sarajevo in February 1994, to dissuade a continuation of the Serb shelling of the city. Or, it could have denied (but did not) the Serb forces their attack on Dubrovnik in 1992 by counter-shelling from the sea or bombing from the air of the batteries in the hills above the city. Forcing a peace depends on achieving a complicated preponderance in which the forces (UN and local) supporting a settlement acceptable to the international community hold both a military predominance and a predominance of popular support, which together permit them to impose a peace on the recalcitrant local military forces and their popular supporters.

Countries provide troops to UN peace operations in various ways. Troop contributing countries negotiate in detail the terms of the participation of their forces either under UN command and thus with the Secretary-General (as in El Salvador or Cambodia); with a regional organization authorized as delegated in Chapter VIII; or with the leader of a multinational “coalition of the willing” authorized under Chapter VII (as was the case of US leadership of UNITAF in Somalia). Many operations draw on a combination of authorizations: peace treaties among factions, backed up or supplemented by other measures authorized (such as arms embargoes, no-fly zones) under Chapter VII, as did the various UNROFOR and IFOR operations. And, as named in honor of its sponsors, “Chinese Chapter Seven” (employed to authorize the use of force for UNTAES) has emerged as a new way to signal firm intent to enforce a Chapter Six operation. In essence, however, it reaffirms the “Katanga Rule” of the ONUC operation: the traditional principle that force can be used both in self-defense of peacekeeping troops and of the mission (mobility of the force).

The result of these three “generations” operating together in the post-Cold War world was an unprecedented expansion of the UN’s role in the protection of world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in countries until recently torn by costly civil wars. Self-determination and sovereignty were enhanced and a modicum of peace, rehabilitation and self-sustaining self-determination was introduced in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Eastern Slavonia. Tens – perhaps, even hundreds – of thousands of lives were saved in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. But in 1993 and 1994, the more ambitious elements of “third generation” peace enforcement encountered many of the problems interventionist and imperial strategies have faced in the past, and discovered fresh problems peculiar to the UN's global character.

The debacles in Somalia and Bosnia forced a radical re-thinking of when and where the UN should get involved. Disingenuously, President Clinton told the General Assembly that it needed to learn when to say, “No.” Many came to believe that the UN was not well-suited to mounting effective peace operations – no more suited to make peace than the lobbyists who represented a trade group of hospitals would be to conduct

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The Challenge of Peacebuilding

The United Nations, as we will argue, has been and can continue to be effective at peace operations, provided it takes to heart the true meaning of its successes and failures. This is not a straightforward task.

Measuring successful peace is a complicated substantive and methodological issue and much debated in the literature. Many use the Correlates of War (COW) definition of peace (fewer than 1000 battle deaths per annum).\(^{35}\) We adopt a similar standard as one measure of peace, which we call “negative” or “sovereign” peace, reflecting that single sovereignty, a Hobbesian Leviathan, has been reestablished that exercises a legitimate monopoly of violence. But we also add to that standard measure a second definition of peace. The second definition is “positive,” or “participatory” peace, which discounts “peace’s of the grave” (the former enemy is all dead or in prison) in favor of a peace that includes wider participation.\(^{36}\) We add data from the Polity project to code a minimal degree of political assent and participation.\(^{37}\) We add this second definition for two reasons. One is to tap into the ordinary association of “peace” with a condition of agreement and acceptance. The other is to identify peace with participation as the beginning of what can be a much more lasting and stable peace. The statistical association between peace and democracy may be U-shaped; both tough autocracies and well-established (usually wealthy) democracies maintain civil peace. Semi-democracies (or anocracies) tend to be most prone to civil war.\(^{38}\) Participatory peace is thus a


\(^{36}\) In our previous work (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) we called “sovereign” peace “lenient” peacebuilding and “participatory” peace “strict” peacebuilding. We now prefer the more descriptive terms that rest on the distinction drawn by Kenneth Boulding (1964) between negative and positive peace and followed by many others. See Kenneth Boulding, “Toward a Theory of Peace,” in Roger Fisher, ed., *International Conflict and Behavioral Science* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp: 70-87.


difficult status, one designed to measure whether the post-war state has entered a path toward democratic civil peace.

Participatory peace is, however, worth striving for (hence measuring) because it offers the prospect of peace as a self-sustaining conflict resolution mechanism – the promise that future disputes will be negotiated, resolved according to constitutionally agreed procedures. While we summarize and expand our earlier results on the determinants of peacebuilding, in this book we want a more finely textured discussion that reflects other aspects of success – the quality of public liberties, degrees of social integration, or the rates of economic growth, and these vary among our cases. So we present a systematic comparison based on statistical analysis and then a more nuanced discussion of the quality of the peace in our case studies.39 (It does make a difference that a former guerrilla commander became the mayor of San Salvador.)

Distinguishing strategies and outcomes is another methodological challenge. In the real world, they are never completely separable: political strategies rely on expectations about expected outcomes. But the analytic separation should be highlighted as much as is feasible.40 For example, concerning the use of force – a UN-managed strategy of force is usually ineffective when it seeks to impose a peace (e.g. Somalia); but often effective when it is used in discrete bits to implement a comprehensive peace treaty (Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia). The difference here is the context of the comprehensive peace, not the same strategy with different outcomes. Then the complications set in about how much coercion is compatible with “agreement” etc. and in the case studies we will discuss this.

We also distinguish between fulfilling a mandate and establishing a peace. Peacebuilding, when comprehensively planned and executed, achieves a sustainable peace. But not all peace operations are well-designed; some are stopgaps and others are misconceived. Peace operations can fulfill their specific mandates authorized by the Security Council or NATO or another body and sustainable peace yet can still be elusive. Lightly armed peacekeepers sent into the middle of raging civil wars where there is “no

Review 97 (1): 75–90). In related, ongoing research, Jennifer Gandhi and James R. Vreeland show that even in autocracies, political institutions can help reduce the risk of civil war. This would be consistent with our theoretical argument, if institutions are seen as ways to devolve some decision-making authority and increase participation, however marginally. See Jennifer Gandhi and James R. Vreeland, 2004, “Political Institutions and Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,” Unpublished manuscript, Emory University and Yale University (August 30 version).

39 Much of the statistical analysis is included in a supplement that we make available online (see chapter 3 for the web address), but we discuss the main results in chapter 3. This organizational structure of the book allows readers who are not interested in the technical details to follow the argument without having to read through extensive technical discussions of data collection and coding, model estimation and hypothesis testing.

40 If strategies are endogenous to expectations about outcomes and we want to evaluate the effects of strategies on outcomes, this raises several technical issue with selection and endogeneity that we address in our statistical analysis in chapter 3 and in our supplement.
peace to keep” do their job, but in circumstances of frustration. Beleaguered peacekeepers and harried UN civil servants naturally want their performance to be measured by whether or not they fulfilled the mandate (to monitor a truce, deliver humanitarian supplies, hold an election etc) that they were given by the Security Council.41 This is reasonable and this we do in the case studies that follow. But we also want to assess in our statistical analysis whether the mandate itself is well-designed to achieve a sustainable peace, and thus whether the Security Council itself did its job.42 This we will measure also when we note how long the peace lasts after the peacekeepers leave. And, sometimes, though rarely, peace operations can fail their mandates and fortunate domestic circumstances can rescue the peace, as happened when Angolan military forces killed opposition leader Jonas Savimbi and the intractable (to the UN) insurgency collapsed.

In our analysis of the UN’s role in making war and making peace, we will focus on four cases of failure – Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda43 and Cyprus – and six cases of success – Congo,44 El Salvador, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, Brcko in Northern Bosnia and East Timor. In the conclusion, we will highlight the lessons of these cases for understanding the on-going challenges of peace operations.

Some of these cases are well-known and we draw on available evidence to develop them in our analysis. Others we have observed in person and, in those cases, we draw on first-hand experience and primary research. Each case represents a particular type of failure or success, chosen to illustrate the key factors that our quantitative study and our theoretical model reveal as important. Other cases will also be addressed in this book, though only in passing.

41 Many scholars follow them in this preference; see for example Simon Chesterman’s thoughtful and informative study of the variety of mandates; Simon Chesterman, You the People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

42 The Security Council has welcomed the Secretary-General’s Report, “No Exit without Strategy,” (S/2001/394, 20 April 2001) in which sustainable peace is recognized as the goal to wad which an exit strategy should be designed.

43 In our dataset, we code two events of civil war in Rwanda in the 1990s. The failure here refers to the peace process that started with the Arusha Accords in 1993 and ended with the genocide of 1994. The post-genocide peace process has been a mixed case: there have been genuine improvements in governance and reconciliation, but also significant violence in border regions.

44 This is a good example of the difference between success conceived narrowly as the implementation of the mandate and a broader view of success that focuses on levels of violence and participation in the country after the peacekeepers leave. With respect to both sovereign and participatory peace, the Congo was a peacebuilding failure according to criteria that we establish later in the book. But the UN mission in the Congo (ONUC) was successful in implementing its mandate of keeping the country together despite strong secessionist conflict in Katanga and elsewhere.
The book will focus on the 1990’s because there was very little of this comprehensive peacebuilding before then. Our two Cold War cases – Congo and Cyprus – were exceptions. This was partly because the Cold War precluded UN involvement (due to Soviet or US vetoes in the Security Council). Consequently, there emerged a backlog of addressable civil wars, accounting for the surge in the early 90’s. Although the rate of onset of civil wars may be declining, the challenges of peacebuilding are all too likely to continue to arise.

One of the most important challenges the international community faces is thus the question of how to rebuild stable polities in the aftermath of civil war. How can the international community assist former combatants with a will to peace to prevent renewed hostility and to contain the ambitions of those who seek renewed civil war? What role should the international community play in ensuring that failed states do not relapse into chaos as soon as the international peacekeepers leave? The United Nations and various regional organizations, including NATO, have accepted the responsibility to undertake “post-conflict peacebuilding” and commissioned their member states to undertake extensive intrusions into the domestic affairs of other legally sovereign states.

What guidelines should be developed to help steer these ambitious mandates? In current usage in the UN and among private voluntary organizations, peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Strengthening state institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land reform, deepening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all these are seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance. In pluralistic societies, conflicts are inevitable. The aim of peacebuilding is to build the social, economic and political institutions and

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45 However, in our statistical analysis, we use data from the entire post-1945 period to evaluate the UN’s record. We tested for significant differences between the pre-Cold War and post-Cold War periods, but the number of cases becomes too small when we break the postwar period in this way, so we prefer to analyze all years since 1945.


attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts. In effect, peacebuilding is the front line of preventive action.

**Plan of the Book**

We begin in Chapter Two with the development of a theoretical framework that explains how peacekeeping can help achieve sovereign and participatory peace after civil war. We start with an analytical review of the debate on the causes and cures of civil wars – the primary strategic element in which the UN found itself in the 1990’s. Then, we develop the logic behind our concept of the peacebuilding triangle that explains how the international community could become involved effectively. The chapter highlights the ways in which international peacekeeping and peace enforcement assistance can compensate for two key barriers to building peace: on the one hand, the hostility that civil wars generate and, on the other hand, the lack of local capacity that makes political and economic reconstruction so difficult. The argument presented here thus identifies the centrality of an international role in resolving civil war conflicts and the key elements essential for successful peacebuilding.

In Chapter Three, we draw on a data set we have constructed that includes all civil wars since 1945 in order to analyze the determinants of successful peacebuilding after civil war. Here, we assess the effectiveness of UN peace operations by comparing peacebuilding outcomes in cases with and without a UN intervention. This macro-level analysis demonstrates the centrality of the peacebuilding triangle and identifies the kinds of roles that the international community has played when peacebuilding has been successful.

Drawing on examples from Somalia and Bosnia, Chapter Four offers a micro-level, case study analysis of how and why the UN tends to fail at making war – imposing by force an overall settlement of civil conflict. Here we also discuss the exceptional case of the Congo in 1960-65, where for special reasons the UN succeeded in imposing an (albeit in many ways inadequate) peace. Chapter Five explores, also at the micro level, how the UN has succeeded in making peace in countries as various as El Salvador, Cambodia, Croatia Bosnia (post-Dayton), and East Timor. And Chapter Six, drawing on the long drawn out peacekeeping effort in Cyprus and the horrendous tragedy in Rwanda, explains how peacekeeping has sometimes failed. Five and six focus on strategies and management and the key role transitional authority plays in managing the tradeoffs of the peacebuilding triangle.

The case studies expand the scope of the statistical analysis by allowing us to explore the distinction between macro-level and micro-level peacebuilding success that

48 No peace is perfect. Isaiah prophesied that we shall know peace when we see the lamb lie down with the lion. The American comedian Woody Allen has added a valuable warning for our world: one of the two might not get much sleep (Isaiah 11:6 and Woody Allen, *Without Feathers*, p. 28).
we do not explore in the statistical analysis. In the cases, we focus on micro-level success and on variables that are hard to measure and use in a large-N statistical analysis; while in the statistical analysis, we focus on macro-level success and analyze the effects of UN operations while controlling for other factors. In the macro-level statistical analysis we are able to assess the effectiveness of the UN because we can compare civil wars with UN involvement to those civil wars where the UN did not intervene. The case studies complement that analysis by focusing more closely on cases of UN intervention and giving us a better view of the dynamics between the factions and UN missions – something that we cannot capture well in our statistical study.

While the statistical analysis includes all peace processes since 1945 (both those with and without a UN operation) and helps us discuss correlations between peacebuilding outcomes and types of UN missions, the case studies help trace out the mechanisms through which UN peace operations contribute to successful peacebuilding. Here we focus on the processes of institutional transformation and capacity expansion that increase the costs of non-cooperation for the factions and create incentives for them to keep the peace. We focus on the peacekeepers’ implementation of their mandate, identifying particular successes and failures in each case, and offering a perspective of the process of peacebuilding over time, discussing both the period before and after the UN’s involvement.

The case studies also help us identify possible explanations for particular peacebuilding outcomes that are not always captured by our model. These can be idiosyncratic explanations – which do not concern our triangle model of peacebuilding—or they can be more important, generalizable explanations that our model overlooks. To identify explanations that go beyond our model, but also to place our discussion of the UN’s missions in context, we begin each case with a brief history of the conflict and introduce the main actors as well as the circumstances that led to the UN’s involvement. We present “vital statistics” for each case for all variables that we consider in our statistical analysis so that readers can get an immediate sense of how this case fits with the average case in our dataset. We also discuss explicitly how well (or how poorly) those cases fit the statistical model and explain why. We consider alternative explanations and link our analysis of the success or failure of peacebuilding to the theoretical explanations of civil war onset and recurrence developed in the theory chapter.

In Chapter Seven, we compare how various strategies to make, keep, build and enforce peace were implemented and illustrate the role transitional authority plays in managing a transition to peace. Here, we develop the concept of ecologies of peacebuilding and return to our case studies and our data to characterize the particular peace building ecology for each of our cases. This allows us to better evaluate the type of UN involvement that we should have observed in each case if the UN mandated and resourced its missions efficiently. Finally, in the conclusion, we consider alternatives to UN peacebuilding and summarize the record of experience from which the organization is still learning today.
If the world does not fall back into another cold war among the permanent members of the Security Council, then the UN is likely to be involved in the new civil and international wars. Anthony Lake, the Clinton Administration national security adviser, expressed it well in his *6 Nightmares*: “America must also do its part in peacekeeping operations, working whenever possible through the United Nations. If we do not, our interests suffer, our leadership diminishes, and innocent people die.”\(^49\) After much initial skepticism about the value of peacebuilding, the Bush administration (following 9/11) launched two extremely ambitious efforts to remake Afghanistan and Iraq, both eventually with substantial UN involvement.

The CIA’s *Global Trends 2015* study presented a comprehensive summary of the prospective threat and is worth quoting at length:

Through 2015, internal conflicts (emphasis supplied) will pose the most frequent threat to stability around the world. … Many internal conflicts, particularly those arising from communal disputes, will continue to be vicious, long-lasting and difficult to terminate—leaving bitter legacies in their wake. They frequently will spawn internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian emergencies, and other regionally destabilizing dislocations. If left to fester, internal conflicts will trigger spillover into inter-state conflicts as neighboring states move to exploit opportunities for gain or to limit the possibilities of damage to their national interests. …

The United Nations and several regional organizations will continue to be called upon to manage some internal conflicts because major states—stressed by domestic concerns, perceived risk of failure, lack of political will, or tight resources—will wish to minimize their direct involvement.\(^50\)

A quick glance around the world today would suggest that this prediction has already come true. Indeed, a new set of peacebuilding challenges – with or without the UN – are on the horizon, reflecting if nothing else the ambitious agenda of disarmament-through-regime change embodied in the new US National Security Doctrine of preventive “preemptive defense.” Unfortunately, it thus appears, the lessons that this book will be drawing will likely be useful both for the present and the future.

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Chapter Six (excerpt – case study on Cyprus)

Making Peace – Failures

It will not come as a surprise that it takes much more than an agreement – a truce or a peace treaty – to make a peace. Each of the peace operations we surveyed in the previous chapter, unlike the interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and the Congo, benefited from an agreement. But so, too, did the peace operations we examine next, the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus (United Nations Force in Cyprus, or UNFICYP) and Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR). These operations, too, deployed military peacekeepers and engaged in some civilian peacebuilding activities. What was missing and made these two operations fail is more subtle: how they were designed and how they were managed. Problems of design, management, and implementation were also partly responsible for the failures in Bosnia and Somalia (see chapter 5).

Failures can have extended consequences. Although a genuine Cyprus peace agreement appeared close at hand in 2003, it too collapsed and the people of Cyprus have suffered a divided homeland for more than a quarter century. For the people of Rwanda and, particularly, for the 800,000 who succumbed, the consequences were much more severe – the single largest genocide since the Holocaust. Understanding how peace operations can fail is a crucial task for scholars but is not merely an “academic” exercise.

Cyprus

Cyprus, 80% Greek and 20% Turkish, was a British colony until it became independent in 1960 with a federal government and three “guarantors” of its independence and security – Greece, Turkey, and Britain.51 Despite these external guarantees, Cyprus descended into civil war soon after independence. Extensive power-sharing arrangements in the 1960 constitution, which provided for a Greek Cypriot (GC) President and a Turkish Cypriot (TC) Vice-President, failed to resolve intense inter-ethnic antagonism that was fueled by the GCs’ desire for enosis (union with Greece) and the TCs’ desire for taksim (partition) and within three years the state was paralyzed.

President Makarios proposed thirteen constitutional amendments that would have undermined Turkey’s role as a guarantor power and circumscribed the TCs’ political rights. Civil war broke out in December 1963. The TCs began to withdraw from ethnically mixed regions and formed self-administered militarized enclaves. Rejecting a proposal for a NATO peacekeeping force to prevent an imminent Turkish invasion of the island, President Makarios asked the Security Council for UN peacekeeping assistance.

UNFICYP was deployed in March 1964. Diplomatic pressure from the UN, US and Britain led the way to inter-communal talks in 1968. The negotiations aimed at a comprehensive solution of both constitutional and territorial problems but, after six years, they were fruitless. The talks were interrupted by a Greek military coup against the GC government in July 1974, followed by a Turkish invasion five days later. The invasion displaced more than 40% of the population as Turkey occupied – and continues to occupy— 37% of the island. In 1977 and 1979, two High-Level agreements decided that the Cypriots would negotiate a bicomunal, bizonal, federal republic, but all subsequent negotiations have failed to produce an agreement. The de facto partition of the island persists despite the planned European Union membership for Cyprus. As the GC government negotiated its accession to the European Union, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” worked toward becoming integrated with Turkey. The reintegration of the island seems improbable, though in recent years that idea was revived in the context of discussions about the integration of Cyprus to the European Union (which was decided in April 2003; more on this later).

The Intercommunal Talks of 1968-1973 represented the best—perhaps also the last—opportunity for a formal peace settlement. The talks failed and gave way to a seemingly stable partition, yet the divided sovereignty and continued presence of peacekeepers almost thirty years since their initial deployment does not allow us to speak of a peacebuilding success in Cyprus.

Our model correctly predicts a PB failure in Cyprus. But, it does not necessarily do so for all the right reasons. The peacebuilding space was narrow, partly as a result of high levels of hostility and partly as a result of insufficient levels of international capacities. We depict this in Figure 6.1, where we plot actual values of our

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54 We place the “TRNC” in quotation marks, as it lacks international recognition.
55 The in-sample prediction of participatory PB success from Model A (Table 3.3) in chapter 3 is .043 for Cyprus after the 1974 war, as compared to an average probability of 0.32.
three key indices for hostility, international capacities, and local capacities for Cyprus, graphing the PB triangle that described the peacebuilding ecology in Cyprus in 1974.

![Figure 6.1: The Peacebuilding Triangle in Cyprus, 1974](image)

The model correctly captures the significant hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was intensified by the massive refugee movements after the ethnic war and partition of 1974. Negotiations to reach a settlement were complicated and it was not possible to reach a treaty, as we will see in more detail below, by the fact that five factions were involved in the peace process, including the governments of Greece and Turkey that often acted as spoilers. Hostility levels should have been offset at least partially by the relatively high levels of local capacities in Cyprus (see Table 6.1). Our proxy of electricity consumption per capita does a good job in capturing the large differential between development levels in Cyprus and other countries in our dataset, but the primary commodity exports proxy is less successful, as it places Cyprus near the average for the universe of cases, while Cyprus did not have a significant dependence on lootable resources such as oil, previous stones, timber, or other resources that have been linked to civil war. Thus, our estimates of the probability of PB success would have been somewhat higher if we had used a resource-dependence proxy that was better measured for our cases.56 But, despite high levels of per capita income, income growth was

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56 Sambanis (2004) discusses the implications of poor fit between empirical proxies (including primary commodity exports as a share of GDP) and theoretically significant variables in quantitative studies of civil war. In other cases that we examine in this book (e.g. the Congo), the primary commodity export measure works much better.
negative immediately after the war, so our model (when we add growth to the equation) captures the declining local capacities after the war.

Table 6.1: Peacebuilding Ecology and Outcomes in Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strict Peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Type</th>
<th>“Ethnic”</th>
<th>“Ethnic”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mandate</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of UN mandate (months)</td>
<td>429.5</td>
<td>429.5 (since 1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was UN present during the war? If so, for how long?</td>
<td>Yes; 43 months</td>
<td>Yes; 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum troop strength of UN mission, if any</td>
<td>6,411</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (in months)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real per capita GDP (at start of the war; constant $)</td>
<td>2,437</td>
<td>4,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real per capita GDP (at end of the war; constant $)</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>3,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth at end of the war (% annual change)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People killed during the war</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People displaced during the war</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome of the War</td>
<td>Truce/Stalemate</td>
<td>Truce/Stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was a treaty signed by most parties?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of the treaty, if any was signed</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the treaty implemented?</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary commodity exports as % of GDP</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the country a major oil exporter?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (100=highest)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic heterogeneity index (1=highly diverse)</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population at start of war (in thousands)</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (square kilometers)</td>
<td>9,250</td>
<td>9,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Development Assistance as % of GDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking more closely at this case, we find evidence of what we called micro-level peacekeeping failures, which contributed to a dynamic peacekeeping-peacebuilding relationship that helped institutionalize the conflict. This mechanism, which we described in theory in chapter 2, is illustrated well by the case of Cyprus. Repeated peacekeeping failures undermined the incentives for peace even among moderates and allowed spoilers to dominate the peace process.

It is true that UNFICYP was constrained externally by the UN’s financial crisis and major power interests, which explains why a traditional (weak) mandate was given to a UN mission that was sent to help resolve a difficult cooperation problem. But UNFICYP had more leverage than it actually used and was responsible for failures that contributed to the conflict’s institutionalization over time. The Intercommunal Talks, which we will analyze below in some detail so as to understand better the parties’
strategies and their preferences over outcomes, were plagued by spoiler problems. There were extremists on all sides, but the dominant spoiler in Cyprus (after 1971) was EOKA B, a paramilitary organization headed by General George Grivas (Greece and Turkey also acted as spoilers after 1973). Grivas had been the leader of the GC anti-colonial struggle during 1955-59 and was fixated on enosis despite the fact that by the mid-1960s most Cypriots preferred independence and enosis seemed politically infeasible. Grivas was prepared to start a war with Turkey to achieve enosis, despite Turkey’s overwhelming military superiority. EOKA B was a destabilizing force that undermined internal GC cohesion through a campaign of terror that culminated in assassination attempts against Makarios.

Consistent with our theoretical arguments about spoiler problems in chapter 2, we argue that UNFICYP should have used all available means to neutralize extremists and EOKA B in particular. Its inability to do so prevented the moderates from acting like peacemakers in the negotiations. This was a peacekeeping failure at the micro-level, which ultimately contributed to a broad peacebuilding failure. UNFICYP had the capacities to do more. Its shortcomings reflected acts of omission more than acts of commission and demonstrate how failed peacekeeping can lead to failed peacemaking.

The discussion in this section focuses on the pre-1975 period, as that was the critical period in Cypriot history. With the de facto partition of the island in 1974 and after the ethnic cleansing and deployment of 30,000 Turkish troops in the North by 1975, UNFICYP’s role was reduced to that of an onlooker. It would be hard to argue that the absence of large-scale violence in Cyprus since 1974-75 was due to the presence of just over 1,000 poorly equipped peacekeepers with a narrow mandate rather than the deterrent effect of Turkey’s military superiority over both Cyprus and Greece. Thus, to analyze the effect of UN peacekeeping on UN peacemaking and peacebuilding failures in Cyprus, we have to focus on pre-1974 UNFICYP.

Crawling to the Negotiation Table: the 1968-74 Intercommunal Talks

The talks were held between GC Speaker of the House Glafcos Clerides and TC leader Rauf Denktash, who was unexpectedly conciliatory, proposing a measure of local autonomy for the TCs in exchange for a GC-dominated central government and acceptance of some of the GCs’ constitutional amendments. Makarios opportunistically intervened and demanded the abolition of the TC Vice-Presidency, the abrogation of the 1959 Treaties, the creation of a unified voter roll, and a unified regional 57 Interview with a senior member of EOKA B (Limassol, August 1997).

58 Clerides argues that Denktash’s proposals were “well within what is accepted generally as normal local government functions.” See Glafkos Clerides, 1989, My Deposition. 4 volumes (Nicosia: Aletheia Press, 1989-92), vol.2, pp. 236-7. Details of the proposals are given in Rauf R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle (New York: Office of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1988), pp. 54 ff.
council appointed by the House with jurisdiction over Greek and Turkish Villages. Interpreting Makarios’ proposals as a sign of unwillingness to discuss meaningful TC autonomy, Denktash interrupted the talks on July 18, 1968. When the talks resumed, the military balance on the island had changed (see below) and Denktash retracted his earlier offer. He now asked for a TC regional administration with supreme jurisdiction over regional affairs and focused the talks on the distinction between “administrative and political” local autonomy. Clerides offered administrative autonomy while Denktash demanded political autonomy. Disagreement over the meaning of “autonomy” ended the talks on June 26, 1971. The GCs had not realized how important local autonomy was to the TCs. The SG broke the deadlock by opening a new round of talks, now including Special Representative (SGSR) Osorio Tafall and two constitutional law experts, Judge Dekleris from Greece and Professor Aldikaçti from Turkey.

The talks resumed on June 8, 1972, on the basis of the SG’s aide-mémoire of October 1971. Local autonomy was again at the forefront and, by the end of 1972, the negotiators seemed to have reached a consensus. This was an electoral period and Makarios decided to proceed with elections before an agreement was reached against the advice of the negotiators, who feared that holding the elections would intensify the GC factional conflict and impede the negotiations. Thus, on December 12, 1972, Clerides asked Makarios to accept the TCs’ offer that was then on the table, but Makarios refused to budge. Clerides, in his memoirs, describes this as a missed opportunity: “In 1972, we could have had a solution of our problem based on a much improved constitution than the Zurich one, and on a unitary state, without refugees, missing persons and foreign troops occupying our island. We rejected it because it did not give us the maximum of our aims.

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60 See Denktash (1988, 56). Clerides (1989, 272-75) believed that the TC enclaves would create a de facto cantonization. To prevent violent conflict, he proposed to recognize the TCs’ demands for local self-government in exchange for a reduced TC participation in the central government’s executive, but Makarios rejected his proposals.
61 Kranidiotis 1985a.
64 Dekleris 1981, pp. 101-4; 124-138
65 The SG’s aide-mémoires outlined the framework and targets of the intercommunal talks. See S/10401, 30 November 1971 and S/10564, Add. 1, 2, 18 March 1972.
i.e. Cyprus, a Greek Cypriot island ruled by the Greek Cypriot majority… Today, seventeen years later, if the 1972 solution was possible … we would have grasped [it] with both hands.”  

Makarios was re-elected President and Denktash Vice-President. These results enraged GC paramilitary extremists who launched a guerilla campaign against the government. The National Guard was divided between enosis-supporters and Makarios-supporters. To avoid a new round of civil war, the negotiators issued a joint statement in June 1973 claiming that they had reached an “agreement in principle.” However, in the Fall of 1973, regime changes in Greece and Turkey brought to power hard-liners who opposed the negotiations. On July 15th 1974, the Greek dictators staged a coup in Cyprus and five days later Turkey invaded Cyprus, ending six years of negotiations.

**Spoiler Problems in the Cyprus Peace Process**

The failure of the Intercommunal Talks was largely the result of spoiler problems. Makarios and Denktash were both opportunistic spoilers and GC paramilitaries consistently acted as if no form of power-sharing would be tolerable, undermining the ability of moderates such as Clerides to make peace. EOKA B aggravated Makarios’ obstructionism, limited Clerides’ room for maneuver and allowed Denktash to stall, pointing to Makarios’ own spoiler behavior in justification of TC non-cooperation.

Grivas targeted Makarios-supporters for violence, declaring them traitors. Clerides commented on the constraints that EOKA B had created for the negotiators in a speech at the House of Representatives. 68 According to Clerides, “Makarios and his ministers found it necessary, in order to counter accusations made by Grivas and his supporters that they had betrayed the sacred cause of enosis, to deliver patriotic speeches, stressing that enosis was a sacred cause and the ultimate goal...” 69 Grivas resited Makarios’ efforts at inducement, 70 leaving only coercion as the possible means to control him. Makarios, however, was not lagging far behind in terms of spoiler behavior. He first signaled his extremist preferences in 1964, when he ordered a surprise attack on the TC Mansoura-Kokkina enclave while Dean Acheson was negotiating a peace plan in Athens with representatives from Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the GC National Guard. 71

As Turkey responded with air raids and prepared to land troops, the Greek Prime-minister Papandreou accused Makarios of greed and underhandedness. Papandreou asked the

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67 Clerides 1990, 367.

68 Denktash 1988, 62.


70 Attempts at inducement were made on several occasions, including at a formal meeting on March 26, 1972. Kranidiotis (1985b, 188 ff) gives a detailed account of that meeting.

71 Kranidiotis 1985b, 240.
Cypriot Ambassador: “Why is Makarios doing these things? We had agreed to maintain the peace. In Geneva, there are at this moment decisive talks concerning the future of Cyprus. Could it be that Makarios’ military operations at Mansoura are aimed at undermining these talks? … I have been deceived!”  

Makarios, however, was a rational extremist and, unlike Grivas, was amenable to cooperation if pushed hard enough. But the threat of EOKA B retaliation encouraged him to act like a greedy spoiler.

In contrast to Makarios, Clerides was then – and still was in 2003 — a moderate and a peacemaker. Clerides was instrumental in the near-agreements of 1968 and 1972/73 and had convinced Makarios to reconcile some of his views with suggestions made by the Athens government. Since 1964, the government of Greece had been trying to destabilize Makarios’ authority due to the Archbishop’s unwillingness to follow Athens’ lead. However, after the 1967 crisis, Greece abandoned enosis and turned from spoiler to peacemaker. It supported the talks and pressured Makarios to make concessions, such as establishing a constitutional basis for local government and delineating their rights and responsibilities and creating TC police forces for TC villages. The Greek Foreign Affairs Minister Palamas believed that “new existing conditions and the real terms in which the whole issue is evolving” necessitated a more compromising GC position. In 1972, after Makarios’ unwillingness to follow Clerides’ suggestions, the Greek government threatened to intervene against Makarios. However, Greece’s peacemaker role was a reluctant one as Greek officials refused to publicly denounce enosis unless Makarios did so first. Doing so would have made Makarios the target of ultra-nationalists in both Cyprus and Greece, so Makarios promised to “cut off his hands” before signing such an agreement, unless Greece did so first. Prisoners of their own nationalist rhetoric, both the Greek leadership and Makarios could not make a peace overture. In November 1973, a coup in Athens brought a more extremist group of officers to power in the Greek junta. Brigadier Ioannides was the new ruler and he now

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72 Kranidiotis’ 1985a, 244; authors’ translation.

73 Greek governments between 1963-67 had important differences with Makarios. Prime Minister Karamanlis advised Makarios not to try to amend the 1960 constitution. Later, Prime Minister George Papandreou tried to get Makarios to accept the Acheson plan and, when Makarios refused, Papandreou tried to undermine Makarios’ government (Clerides 1989, 142-50; 175-91). On Greece’s attitude change in 1968, see Kranidiotis (1985a, 521-2), who reproduces Foreign Minister Pipinelis’ memorandum of 27 November 1968 accusing Makarios of stalling unnecessarily in the talks. Pipinelis also stressed that the 1967 crisis left no alternative to the Greek side except to support the talks and pressured Makarios to accept Denktash’s terms.

74 Kranidiotis 1985b, 593-600.

75 See Clerides (1990, Appendix C) for a list of reproduced letters from the Greek government to Makarios, one of which, dated February 1972 from Mr. Panayotakos, a member of the Greek junta, threatened Makarios that “Greece would intervene in the island’s affairs if her interests demanded it.”

76 Clerides 1990, 270.
supported EOKA B’s hawks, deciding to remove Makarios forcibly.  On July 15, 1974, Ioannides staged a coup in Cyprus, opening the door to Turkey’s invasion.

Throughout the crisis and until the present, the TC side has been represented by Rauf Denktash. His extremism was kept in check until the GCs rejected his 1968 proposals, which admittedly made him look like a peacemaker. Over time, Denktash realized that secession was a viable option and he adopted an increasingly uncooperative attitude. In 1970-71, he aggravated the GCs’ spoiler problem by demanding that Makarios publicly denounce enosis and that he put in writing all of the GCs’ concessions. Denktash knew that this would undermine Makarios’ position and could have anticipated Makarios’ objections. When Makarios refused to publicly and formally announce all his concessions to the TCs, Denktash used this as an excuse to interrupt the talks. His actions since 1971 were consistently those of a greedy spoiler. With Bulent Ecevit’s election as Prime-Minister in Turkey in 1973, Denktash acquired a hardline advocate. Denktash now demanded a federation—a solution synonymous to partition for the GCs. This further aggravated GC hardliners, making negotiation even harder for Clerides and Dekleris.

Despite Makarios’ and Denktash’s obstructionism and opportunism, a compromise might have been possible if the GCs traded constitutional concessions for territorial ones from the TCs. On the basis of interviews, historical and survey research in Cyprus, we have determined that both parties valued constitutional issues more than territorial adjustment, but the TCs wanted territorial adjustment more than the GCs. A welfare-increasing bargain was possible if the parties’ relative valuation of constitutional and territorial concessions changed, but this was not possible due to intense pressure by the radical extremists on both sides. Moderates such as Clerides were concerned that compromise might cause an internal GC civil war. The important question is if and how UNFICYP might have been able to help control these spoiler problems.

77 Dekleris (1981, 232 ff.) writes about Ioannides’ links with Grivas. Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus* (London: Quartet Books, 1984), quotes excerpts from US State Department documents revealing that Ioannides’ intentions were to topple the Makarios regime, counting on US support to control Turkey if it tried to intervene.

78 Dekleris 1981, 140-1.

79 See former SG Waldheim’s memoirs (Kurt Waldheim, *In the Eye of a Storm: A Memoir* (London: Adler & Adler, 1985). In his memoirs, Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 231-4, describes Denktash’s tactics as “intolerable” and argues that as long as Denktash is the leader of the TCs, there cannot be a settlement.

80 We used an elite survey and structured interviews conducted by Sambanis during the summer of 1997 to obtain information on policymaker preferences. We interviewed most Foreign Service officers working on the Cyprus problem, party leaders and approximately 30% of the members of the House of Representatives. TC policymakers did not make themselves available for interviews, with the exception of 5 interviews over two years with senior TC diplomats representing the “TRNC” in the United States.
The Need for Proactive Peacekeeping and UNFICYP’s Sins of Omission

UNFICYP has been both a blessing and a curse for the United Nations. On the one hand, UN proponents can claim the absence of war in Cyprus since 1974 as a peacekeeping success. Ralph Bunche once remarked that if the United Nations “were as good at making peace as UNFICYP [was] at keeping it, then… [the UN] would have few problems.”81 On the other hand, the lack of a political settlement years after almost 30 years of UN peacekeeping suggests to some that UNFICYP may have become part of the problem, a “fixture” that has reduced the parties’ incentives to negotiate a settlement.82 While these two views disagree on the consequences of UNFICYP’s success, they agree that UNFICYP has been a peacekeeping success. By reviewing this case and applying the framework for the evaluation of peacekeeping operations that we outlined in chapter 2 (i.e. by distinguishing between macro-level and micro-level peacekeeping failure), we debunk the myth of UNFICYP’s success. We agree with authors who point to UNFICYP’s negative effects on peacemaking, but we argue that this was not a perverse consequence of its peacekeeping success, but rather a direct result of its peacekeeping failures.

Security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) mandated UNFICYP “In the interest of international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.” According to the Secretary-General (SG), UNFICYP was “given a very heavy responsibility without a precise definition of its general mandate to guide it so that it might know exactly what it is entitled to do and how far it may go, particularly in the use of force.”83 As the Council’s mandate for UNFICYP was hopelessly vague, the SG clarified UNFICYP’s mandate by outlining a number of concrete objectives for the force.


83 S/5950, 10 September 1964, para. 215.
These objectives make it clear that UNFICYP had an important deterrence and enforcement function. It was also given peacebuilding assignments that resembled mandates given to multidimensional peace operations in the 1990s. UNFICYP was not, however, given the resources (e.g. civilian personnel) to discharge these ambitious peacebuilding functions. UNFICYP did not have the manpower required to disarm civilians; it did not have the technical expertise to reintegrate the Cyprus police and formulate amnesty arrangements; it did not have the fire-power to guarantee the safe return of all displaced persons or the return of TC civil servants to their positions; and did not have the civilian staff required to restore the normal functioning of the judiciary. Thus, these should not be considered as instances of UNFICYP’s peacekeeping failure—they are, rather, examples of the Council’s failure to match the mandate with appropriate resources. Instead, to properly evaluate UNFICYP’s performance, we should assess how well it implemented those aspects of its mandate that it could realistically have achieved given its external constraints, and then assess its impact on the peace process.

**Box 6.1: UNFICYP’s Mandate**

**Establishment:** The mandate, clarified by the SG, called for:

- “Achievement of freedom of movement on all roads in Cyprus, including the Kyrenia road;
- Achievement of freedom of movement for all communities within the whole town of Nicosia and other cities under conditions of security;
- Progressive evacuation and removal of all fortified positions held by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with priority given to Nicosia;
- Examination of the problem arising from the division that has taken place in the Cyprus police between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriot members and the negotiation of necessary measures for their progressive reintegration;
- The progressive disarming of all civilians other than the regular police ‘gendarmerie’ and the Cyprus army by the Cypriot government and the Turkish community.
- UNFICYP, if requested, would assist in facilitating and verifying the disarming and the storage of arms under conditions of security;
- The control of extremists on both sides;
- The formulation of appropriate general amnesty arrangements;
- The arrangement of security measures and other necessary conditions to facilitate return to normal conditions and particularly normal economic activity;
- The facilitation of the return of Turkish Cypriot civil servants and Government officials to their duties, including the public services, such as postal, telecommunications, public works, etc.
- The normal functioning of the judiciary.”

**Changes to mandate:** Following hostilities between the two sides in 1974, and the cease-fire of 16 August 1974, UNFICYP acquired additional responsibilities, including: inspection of “the deployment of military forces on both sides” following the cease-fire; maintenance of “the status quo” in the buffer zone between the forward lines of the two forces; monitoring of the cease-fire lines; provision of good offices in facilitating activities across the cease-fire lines; humanitarian assistance through delivery of supplies to

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84 UNFICYP had even been asked to monitor elections. Document S/8446, 9 March 1968, para. 97, notes this request from the TC Vice-President Kutchuk. UNFICYP was ready to assist, but there was no balloting, so it was not necessary for UNFICYP to become involved.

85 S/5671, 29 April 1964.
portions of the island; liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police; cooperation with UNHCR and UNDP.  

**Termination:** UNFICYP is an ongoing UN mission.

Despite shortcomings in manpower and technical specialization, UNFICYP had important successes in non-military activities: it helped improve the TCs’ living conditions in the enclaves; worked to restore the operation of public services throughout Cyprus; facilitated the resumption of harvest; protected workers in factories in the buffer zone; and worked closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and later the UNCHR to help refugees and internally displaced persons after 1974.  

It was also engaged in police work, economic reporting and advising, building construction, school teaching, and technical assistance. In the post-1974 period, UNFICYP acquired an expanded humanitarian role.  

It was responsible for the welfare of GCs residing in the Turkish-occupied northern part of the island and TCs residing in the south. It established liaison arrangements with government agencies and military authorities on both sides and promoted the economic and infrastructure development in the buffer zone; it designed confidence-building measures through bicommmunal communication; and implemented social programs in the last remaining mixed village of Pyla in the buffer zone. All these were considerable achievements primarily in UNFICYP’s civilian peacekeeping and peacemaking role.

UNFICYP’s non-military activities were complemented by CIVPOL, the civilian police force, which became operational on 14 April 1964. CIVPOL was designed to establish a “liaison with the Cypriot police” and accompany them in their patrols. It was also supposed to man UN police posts in trouble spots throughout the island, conduct searches for missing persons, investigate incidents of violence, and conduct a number of other functions which would be better served by unarmed civilian police officers rather than armed soldiers. CIVPOL’s comparative advantage is that its officers are unarmed and not perceived as a threat, so they can be useful in de-confrontation initiatives in the

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86 *Blue Helmets*, 164-5.

87 Boyd (1966), reports his findings from a review of several UN documents on this issue.


89 UN troops escort workers to plants near enemy lines; they provide protection for farmers cultivating land in the buffer zone; and work with the GC government on construction projects around roads and highways that pass through the buffer zone; and have helped restore old factories in the buffer zone.

90 These include, but are not restricted to, forwarding mail across the buffer zone, exchanging currency, and escorting people during visits to the opposite camp.

In many regards, CIVPOL is much more directly involved with the people and has greater ability to resolve problems before they escalate into violence.

Despite these unexpected successes with respect to its humanitarian and civil mandate, UNFICYP fared far worse with respect to its military tasks. Importantly, this was also the area where success was relatively easier, as UNFICYP’s external constraints were not severe (certainly not in comparison to other cases that we have discussed). In 1964, 6,369 troops were deployed from Austria, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and, although UNFICYP’s size dwindled over time (see Figure 6.2), it still outnumbered the GC National Guard (5,000 troops) and the TC paramilitaries (2,000 fighters).93 UNFICYP’s military superiority vis-à-vis the TCs and the GCs was reinforced when Greece offered to place under UN command its 10,000 soldiers (deployed in Cyprus according to the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee). Moreover, Greece, Turkey, Britain and the US were fully supportive of the peace process as of 1968 and until about 1972, so UNFICYP was not significantly constrained in achieving critical aspects of its mandate: establishing freedom of movement, maintaining the military status quo by preventing the fortification of TC enclaves, and assisting the government in defending itself against extremist violence.

Figure 6.2: UNFICYP Troops, 1964-1998


In considering other possible external constraints to UNFICYP’s actions, we also find that the force was not constrained by its command structure, the geography of the conflict, or financing.94 UNFICYP’s command structure has been stable since the start

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92 Interview with Barry Carpenter, Chief CIVPOL officer, Nicosia, September 1997.
93 S/5764, 15 June 1964, para. 44.
94 These are factors that in the literature are considered important determinants of peacekeeping success.
of the operation. The Secretary General is in direct control, appointing the Force commander and a Special Representative (SRSG), who is the chief of the mission. The island’s geography and its small size facilitated troop deployment and communications between components of the Force.\(^95\) The establishment of the buffer zone facilitated UNFICYP’s work since it limited contact between hostile populations.\(^96\) UNFICYP had financing problems that resulted in the gradual downsizing of the Force, but it still maintained considerable strength (relative to the size of the territory and the strength of the parties) and was always a low-cost operation at little risk of being shut down due to financing.\(^97\)

This brief evaluation of UNFICYP’s external constraints suggests that we should look at the mission itself (the “micro-level” or “endogenous” aspects of peacekeeping mentioned in Chapter 2) to explain its successes and failures in implementing its mandate. Good leadership and a proactive interpretation of the mandate would have allowed UNFICYP to enhance the Cypriots’ consent, creating incentives for negotiation. The SG tried to help UNFICYP be more proactive by interpreting several Council resolutions issued after UNFICYP’s deployment as an indirect permission to expand UNFICYP’s authority:\(^98\)

> “I intend to ... instruct the Commander of the Force ... along the following lines: That in establishing the Force and defining its important function, the Security Council realized that the Force could not discharge that function unless it had complete freedom of movement in Cyprus, which could only mean such unrestricted freedom of movement as may be considered essential by the Force Commander to the implementation of the mandate of the Force....

> That the Force, in carrying out its mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting, is reasonably entitled to remove positions and fortified installations where these endanger the peace, and to take all necessary measures in self-defense if attacked in the performance of this duty....

\(^{95}\) A concentrated peacekeeping force is more effective than a widely-dispersed force (Diehl 1993, 62).

\(^{96}\) Diehl 1993, 71.

\(^{97}\) In 1998 UNFICYP cost the UN one twelfth of ONUMOZ’s cost during its first year. Until 15 June 1993, UNFICYP’s costs were borne by troop-contributing countries, the Cyprus government and voluntary contributions. Since UNFICYP’s inception, the eight troop-contributing countries have covered 25% and NATO countries 88% of voluntary contributions, while the Soviet Union did not contribute anything. The cost of the operation in 1998 was US $48 million (gross), close to one half of which was borne by the governments of Cyprus and Greece. The total cost of the operation since its inception is approximately US $940 million (Blue Helmets (1996), General Assembly A/52/775/Add.1, and authors’ calculations).

\(^{98}\) Alan James, “The UN Force in Cyprus,” International Affairs 65 (Summer 1989), 481-500, lists as an example UN Doc S/18102, 31 May 1986, para 7. Resolution 383 (1975) was the first of a series of resolutions in the post-invasion years which modified UNFICYP’s mandate.
That in seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting, it may be demanded by the Commander that the opposing armed forces be separated to reasonable distances in order to create buffer zones in which armed forces would be prohibited.”

These instructions were a green light for UNFICYP to be proactive. Indeed, according to the SG, field commanders were given wide latitude to interpret their mandate as conservatively or as liberally as they saw fit and they were allowed to use force if UN troops were coerced to leave their positions or in other circumstances in which the parties “prevent[ed] them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.”

Mandates can be seen either as ‘ceilings’ or ‘floors.’ Conservative, risk-averse UN officials or Commanders constrained by their home governments will interpret the mandate as a ceiling. By contrast, creative and decisive commanders will take a leadership role by interpreting the mandate as a floor, defining it operationally and using all their capabilities to implement the spirit, not just the word of the mandate. On several occasions, we found evidence of a conservative interpretation of the mandate that suggested passivity on behalf of UNFICYP. Cypriots frequently overran UNFICYP’s posts, manhandled UN troops and refused to comply with orders issued by UN commanders, undermining UNFICYP’s ability to restore law and order. However, UNFICYP was consistently hesitant to use even limited force, when a small amount of force and determination might have gone a long way to restore order. UNFICYP did not restore freedom of movement, control extremists, or de-fortify the TC enclaves.

More importantly, UNFICYP’s shortcomings fueled the conflict. Figure 6.3 shows that, despite a drop in violence in the months preceding UNFICYP’s deployment, there were two outbreaks of violence in 1964 and 1967. These incidents were triggered by UNFICYP’s inability or unwillingness to restore freedom of movement in two large TC enclaves. On several occasions, UNFICYP had taken action to unman fortified posts if they caused violence that threatened UN officers, so UNFICYP’s ability to be forceful was not in question. Indeed, when the UN headquarters came under attack from the Turkish military during the invasion of 1974, UN Force Commander Prem Chand, using the same initiative he had earlier demonstrated in the Congo, showed exceptional resolve and heroism in ordering his troops to stand their ground and fight the invading army. Turkey backed down and Nicosia’s International Airport remained under UN control.

In the summer of 1964, just a few months after the Force became operational, the GCs were complaining to the SG that the TCs were unloading arms and troops from

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99 UN Doc S/5950.
100 UN Doc S/5950.
101 “Ceilings” and “floors” have been widely discussed in UN peacekeeping circles. We first heard the distinction expounded by Derek Boothby, formerly of the Department of Political Affairs.
Turkey at the port of Kokkina, which was protected by a fortified TC bridgehead at Mansoura. The GCs’ claims were justifiable according to the SG’s report, so GC “government authorities on more than one occasion had warned UNFICYP to stop this activity in this area or to stand aside and let the Government do it.” UNFICYP did not forcibly remove the TCs’ fortifications or pressure the TCs to stop their military buildup. This led to a full-blown battle lasting several days between 2,000 GC and Greek soldiers against 500 TCs at Mansoura. Turkey responded by bombing GC military and civilian targets. A Turkish invasion was prevented by US President Johnson’s intervention.

On that critical occasion, UNFICYP chose a weak strategy even though the SG had resolved that UNFICYP should pursue de-fortification as a necessary strategy for the implementation of its mandate. UNFICYP had the manpower to de-fortify the enclave and had forcibly removed fortified posts in Nicosia a few weeks prior because they were threatening UN troops. Thus, its choice of strategy reflected a narrow, conservative, and risk-averse interpretation of the mandate – precisely the type of micro-level, or endogenous peacekeeping failure described in chapter 2. After the Mansoura fighting, under threat of a Turkish invasion and pressure from the SG, Greece withdrew 10,000 elite troops that were manning the island’s coastal defenses, drastically changing the military status quo in Cyprus. As we saw earlier, that reversal of fortunes emboldened Denktash and made the negotiation of a settlement appreciably more difficult.

UNFICYP proponents claim credit for the decline in shooting incidents starting in 1968 (see Figure 6.3). However, that decline coincided with the government’s normalization measures implemented in March of 1968. The government unilaterally removed in the areas of Paphos and Limassol all road blocks, restored freedom of movement for the TCs, and unmanned its fortified posts (except those intended for external defense). The SG recognized that “there has been no better opportunity in Cyprus for … a settlement.” The government extended these measures to the whole island, notwithstanding the establishment of the “Cyprus Turkish Administration” in the enclaves, but insisted that UNFICYP hold the TCs to the same standard. When

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102 S/5950, para. 64.
103 S/5950, paras. 34-36.
104 Detailed eyewitness accounts of the 1974 fighting by Admiral Skiadopoulos (Greece) reveal that despite the lack of air cover, the National Guard was nearly successful in repelling the Turkish invasion during the first day of fighting. It is clear from these accounts that if the 10,000 Greek troops were still on the island, guaranteeing air cover and naval support from Greece, Turkey’s invasion might not have been successful. See Konstantinos Skiadopoulos, Polemos sten Kypro: Ioulios-Avgoustos 1974 (War in Cyprus: July-August 1974) (Athens: Eleftheri Skepsis, 1989).
105 S/8286, 8 December 1967, paras. 90-93.
106 S/8446, 9 March 1968, para. 153
UNFICYP again used weak strategies and failed to coerce the TCs to restore GC access to the Kophinou enclave, the GCs responded with disproportionate force.

Furthermore, the sharp reduction in shooting incidents from 1967-73 coincided with a decline in UNFICYP’s strength (see Figure 6.3), so it is hard to argue that UNFICYP was more active or forceful in preventing these incidents. Rather, the main reason for the decline in inter-ethnic violence was the start of Intercommunal Talks, when the attention of the GC government shifted towards the intra-GC factional conflict. When inter-ethnic violence escalated in 1974-75, UNFICYP’s inability to control it was evident. In 1975, one year after the establishment of a UN-monitored buffer zone between the two ethnic groups, UNFICYP doubled its strength, but the number of shooting incidents was approximately one hundred times higher than the average for the previous five years (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Shooting Incidents in Cyprus, 1964-1975

Sources: UN Docs. S/5593, S/5750, S/5764, S/5950, S/6102, S/6228, S/6426, S/7350, S/8664, S/9233, S/9521, S/9814, S/10005, S/10199, S/10401, S/10664, S/10940, S/11294. An entry of zero does not mean that there were no incidents, but rather that there was no report for that trimester. Further, note that the months including the coup and invasion of 1974 have been omitted from the chart (UNFICYP could not have been responsible for controlling these two events, so shooting incidents related to them are not as relevant for our analysis).

UNFICYP’s sins of commission are overshadowed by its sins of omission, especially its failure to assist the government in its struggle against extremists. UNFICYP feared reprisals and claimed it lacked sufficient intelligence to intercept EOKA B members.\(^{107}\) However, it was possible to control GC spoilers by empowering

\(^{107}\) Interview with UNFICYP’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia, August 1997.
the GC government. UNFICYP, however, undermined the government’s ability to defend itself when, in 1972, it interdicted a large shipment of arms and light artillery. Its mandate never authorized UNFICYP to disarm the parties or inspect imports of arms. However, a rapid rate of arms build up led the SG to negotiate an informal agreement with the parties to allow UNFICYP to monitor all arms imports that arrived through certain ports.\footnote{UN document S/5828, 23 July 1964 includes telegrams by the UNSG to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, urging them to stop the arms build-up in Cyprus.} Both parties violated the agreement and Makarios, especially, opposed interference in this area, citing the government’s sovereign right to import arms.\footnote{UN Doc S/5842.} Despite these constraints, UNFICYP acted decisively to interdict a large arms shipment from Czechoslovakia in 1972. UN intelligence had confirmed that the shipment was intended for Makarios’ police and paramilitaries to fight EOKA B.\footnote{Interview (April 30, 1998) with George Sherry, formerly senior political advisor to UNFICYP.} UNFICYP negotiated with the GC government to surrender the arms to UNFICYP personnel.\footnote{UNFICYP seems to have been pressured by Greece to prevent Makarios from arming his paramilitaries.\footnote{Interview with former UNFICYP official George Sherry (New York, April 1998).} However, if UNFICYP did not want to risk peacekeepers’ lives in fighting EOKA B, it should have at least allowed the government to defend itself. Moreover, a better armed GC government might have discouraged the coup of 1974. That was an unprecedented action that significantly diminished the GC government’s ability to fight terrorists. UNFICYP seems to have been pressured by Greece to prevent Makarios from arming his paramilitaries.\footnote{Interview with former UNFICYP official George Sherry (New York, April 1998).} However, if UNFICYP did not want to risk peacekeepers’ lives in fighting EOKA B, it should have at least allowed the government to defend itself. Moreover, a better armed GC government might have discouraged the coup of 1974.

A second opportunity to control EOKA B presented itself in the fall of 1973 and then again after the death of Grivas in January 1974. Leadership changes present perfect opportunities for spoiler control by providing inducements to new leaders and isolating the extremists.\footnote{See Stedman (1997) on inducements strategies for spoiler management.} A number of moderates emerged from the ranks of EOKA B wanting to transform the organization into a political party. However, neither UNFICYP nor the UN civilian officers in Cyprus openly supported the moderates, who eventually lost out to hawkish members of EOKA B.\footnote{Clerides 1989, 276-9; Polyviou 1980, 125.} Support moderate leaders during that transition would have been an effective and low-cost strategy for UNFICYP.

After the \textit{de facto} partition of 1974, UNFICYP’s mandate informally adapted to the new conditions. UN troops were re-deployed along the cease-fire lines and their priority was to maintain the new military status quo. UNFICYP’s military mandate has
been restricted to monitoring, while some of its previous humanitarian, civil, and police activities continue to this day.115

Overall, UNFICYP failed to implement its peacekeeping mandate. While actually preventing the 1974 invasion would have been too much to ask of a lightly armed force, we noted several failures at a smaller scale that, over time, allowed the military and political status quo to change and undermined the parties’ desire for a negotiated settlement. Failure to defortify the enclaves and restore freedom of movement implied that the TCs could “adaptively” develop stronger preferences for secession – an outcome that was not considered feasible before 1968. As the enclaves grew in size, the TCs developed a socio-political structure and institutions to support independent administration and the return to a unitary state under GC leadership became less and less likely. The TCs interpreted UNFICYP’s passivity as an indication of the legitimacy of their ongoing effort to partition the island.116 The enclaves were therefore the precursor to the “Federated State of Northern Cyprus” and later the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”117 Denktash revealed the significance of experiencing self-administration in the enclaves and in the occupied territories in one of his speeches:

“There has not been a joint State or government embracing both peoples for over a quarter of a century. These two peoples do not have even a single common institution. This reality is of vital importance in defining the starting point of a political association”…“Despite the recognition that the Greek Cypriot side enjoys, everyone silently acknowledges that it is nothing but a Greek Cypriot entity and that there is a corresponding Turkish Cypriot entity” (emphasis supplied).118

As Turkish foreign minister Ezenbel said years ago that there is “no possibility of turning the clock back” in Cyprus.119 The conflict has become so institutionalized that it may have passed the “point of no return.”120 As time passed, institutions, norms, and expectations were formed to sustain a different set of possible solutions from the ones that might have been attainable in the first years after 1963. Perhaps the best example of


116 Ertekun 1984, 72.


119 See Rossides’ letter S/11611, 31 January 1975. Ezenbel’s use of these phrases in this context was confirmed in Denktash’s letter to the SG, S/11631, February 12, 1975.

120 UN SRSG Gus Feissel, interview (Nicosia, summer 1997).
conflict institutionalization in Cyprus is the case of talks on the resettlement of the town of Varosha, a GC town occupied by Turkey after the 1974 invasion. Resolution of the problem of resettling Varosha was given priority in bi-communal negotiations. More than 20 years were spent trying to resolve the Varosha question. In 1977, the UN was pushing for the return of 40,000 GC refugees. Several years later, the return of a smaller number was proposed in exchange for re-opening of the Nicosia airport and opening a corridor for tourists to access the TC part of Cyprus through Varosha, giving the TCs annual revenues up to 20% of their GDP. This solution also was rejected by Denktash and the UN ultimately pushed a plan for the re-opening of the town as a location for limited and temporary bicommmunal meetings without any rights of refugee return. The GCs’ interest in negotiation dwindled as a result of this gradual limitation of their expected gains from a negotiated settlement. Over time and as a result of repeated peacekeeping failures both in the field and at headquarters, the number of feasible bargains became so small that the stalemate was no longer hurting enough to motivate the parties to negotiate.

Cyprus was an example of failed cyprusization—the desired effect of traditional peacekeeping of freezing a conflict until a political solution is reached. UN officials sometimes refer to deadlocked conflicts as “cyprusized”, suggesting that good peacekeeping may have the perverse effect of discouraging peacemaking and negotiation. Our analysis, however, suggests that the Cyprus conflict was in fact changing over time, partially due to UNFICYP’s failure to freeze the military status quo before 1974. Major changes to the status quo included the growth of the enclaves, the establishment of a transitional TC administration, the internal factional conflict on the GC side, the coup and invasion of 1974, the population transfers of 1975 that created ethnically pure regions in a previously demographically mixed country, and the ongoing colonization of Cyprus by Turkish mainlanders as well as the expected EU membership for Cyprus. While in 1968 Denktash seemed eager to negotiate, the failed cyprusization of the conflict changed his incentive structure. Former SG Perez de Cuellar, who dedicated most of his time in office to the Cyprus problem, summarized the problem’s evolution by saying:

“The Turkish Cypriot side, especially its leader, Rauf Denktash, has more to lose than to gain from integration into a reunited Cyprus. … For the Greek Cypriots, the attraction of unification is not sufficient to cause them to accept a settlement that would acknowledge a right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination…. The greatest pressure for a settlement has come from the refugees and displaced persons from the north, who long hoped to regain their property. By the 1980s, however, few actually would have returned. Any [Greek] Cypriot government, no matter what its leadership, is likely to lose

121 UN SRSG Gus Feissel, interview (Nicosia, summer 1997).
politically if it enters into a settlement entailing concessions on the central
principles of unified sovereignty and unified identity for the land.”  

Hugo Gobbi – UN negotiator and former SRSG in Cyprus— wrote about the 251
meetings held between GC and TC leaders over three years (1980-83) and explained that
“the two communities’ ideas of a federation are impossible to merge… I would ask the
Greek Cypriots who do not live as prisoners of the past, what is better: to own 100% of
around three quarters of the Island, or to possess 50% of the whole. Because this is the
only present alternative despite optimistic hopes”.  The GCs, however, have not
accepted that the result of the 1974 invasion is final, but they are also unable to choose
among unappealing alternatives. As a result, another expert on the Cyprus problem
suggested that both the GCs and the TCs are “like shoppers who merely come to the store
to look around, but are unprepared to make a purchase.”  Under the political
uncertainty of a compromise solution, both parties prefer to live with an inefficient status
quo and this is true today as it was during the Intercommunal Talks.

Despite the parties’ demonstrated disinterest in compromising their extreme
positions in favor of reaching a settlement, the UN has pursued tireless peacemaking
initiatives in Cyprus. UNFICYP’s peacekeeping role was eclipsed by the Turkish
occupation of Northern Cyprus (the Turkish army is the second largest in NATO and
Turkey’s proximity to Cyprus has had a stabilizing effect, deterring any GC aspirations to
reversing the status quo through military action). But in the nearly thirty years since the
Turkish invasion, successive UN SRSGs have tried their best to push the peacemaking
process forward.

One of the most impressive efforts was the one launched by Alvaro de Soto’s
team. Taking advantage of scheduled talks to negotiate the accession of Cyprus to the
European Union, the UN drafted a remarkably comprehensive settlement plan known as
the Annan plan. The plan followed on the footsteps of previous attempts (such as de
Cuellar’s “Draft Framework Agreement,” or George Vassiliou’s “Outline Framework for
a Settlement”) but went further in spelling out the intricate details of the workings of a
federal system that would achieve several layers of checks and balances for the TCs.
Intense pressure from the Turkish Cypriot community, which felt that it was missing the
train of Cyprus’s accession to the EU, pushed Denktash to the negotiation table, but was
not sufficient to make him accept the Annan plan. The United Nations, European Union,
United States and other interested parties pressured Denktash (and political elites in
Turkey) to accept the draft, but the talks failed. Ultimately, the GCs also voted against
the Annan plan in a referendum. As this book was being completed, Denktash, under

122 De Cuellar 1997, 234-5.

123 Hugo J. Gobbi, Rethinking Cyprus (Tel Aviv: Aurora, 1983), p. 49.

124 UN SRSG Gus Feissel, interview (Nicosia, summer 1997).
extensive domestic pressure, opened the borders of Northern Cyprus and allowed cross-border visits by both GCs and TCs. This move rekindled hopes of integration and revitalized efforts to add the Annan plan as an annex to Cyprus’s accession treaty with the EU, so that, if and when the Cyprus problem is resolved, the parts of the island and people now controlled by Denktash and Turkey could automatically become part of the EU.

Interestingly, nowhere in these discussions did UNFICYP feature prominently. UNFICYP’s poor peacekeeping record and its reputation for weakness and neutrality are hard to forget. Peacekeeping in a new, integrated Cyprus would be provided by an international peacekeeping force with greater credibility than UNFICYP. UNFICYP’s contribution to the peace today is more cosmetic or symbolic than substantial. UNFICYP could have helped matters more before 1974. But its passivity prevented a positive contribution. UNFICYP’s failure to control extremists is an example of endogenous peacekeeping failure which, over time, helped institutionalize the conflict.

In the late 1960s, George Ball asked Makarios why he was reluctant to agree to a compromise solution. Makarios replied with a question: “should I be killed by the Turks or the Greeks?” Ball’s answer epitomized the scope of international peacebuilding in Cyprus: “Your Beatitude, that’s your problem.” More recent negotiators such as Kofi Annan and Alvaro de Soto have shown more sensitivity and applied great efforts to achieve an equitable solution in Cyprus. But the legacy of the past is hard to forget.

While many have accused the international community of indifference in Cyprus – even after 30% of the population became refugees—this accusation has never been truer than in the case of peacekeeping and peacebuilding failure in Rwanda. We turn to that case next.

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125 Ball 1982, 346.